Wu Shang-su
新加坡拉惹勒南国际问题研究院军事研究项目研究员
Alan Chong
新加坡拉惹勒南国际问题研究院多边主义研究中心副教授
The first transcontinental railway between China and Europe arrived in London on Jan. 18, 2017, exactly 18 days after it began its journey of 12,000 km from Yiwu in eastern Zhejiang province, with its cargo of garments, bags, and other consumer goods. The train carrying 24 containers pulled by a German Deutsche-Bahn locomotive for its final leg, transited Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, Belgium, and France before arriving in Britain. A comparable journey by sea would take 30 days or more though carrying a staggering 20,000 containers.
The steel railroad across the Eurasian heartland symbolizing the new overland Silk Road – officially known as the Silk Road Economic Belt – partly realizes the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) vision of China, and includes the many high-speed rail projects embraced by much of Asia in the past decade. While the pioneer freight train service was welcomed with much fanfare in Britain and China, in reality, a number of obstacles lie on the less than smooth Silk Road.
Different gauges and operators
Several factors currently limit the effectiveness of the railway’s potential in achieving Beijing’s goals. The dozens of existing rail links are not actually inter-connected at the moment. The rail systems in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus use a wide gauge of 1.52 meters, a Soviet legacy, while the Chinese and European systems use a standard gauge of 1.435 meters. This means that the cargo has to be physically transferred between trains whenever crossing between the two regions of gauges, which occurs at least twice during the journey. Despite the effort of China or its Swiss contractor in managing travel time, additional costs would be unavoidable, and Chinese products transported through rail would be in an inferior position in the market, in contrast to the volume conveyed through shipping.
Transferring cargo inevitably increases travel time and encourages the use of freight in standard containers, while discouraging transportation of bulky cargo such as agricultural crops and some types of heavy machinery. Those kinds of bulk cargo may be more competitive for landlocked countries to trade rather than manufactured or processed merchandise in containers. Intercontinental freight services have therefore not significantly improved the geoeconomic position of those landlocked countries in the global market.
Currently, rolling stocks of variable gauge axles (VGA) for trains running on different gauges, especially transferring between the standard and wide gauges, are available in several European countries, including freight services. However, such expensive and complicated designs, mainly reserved for passenger trains, remain impractical for numerous freight trains and do not present an economic solution for China. Although China may introduce VGA technology for local manufacture to lower costs, the deployment of VGA would logically multiply refurbishment and transportation costs on the entire overland Silk Road.
Stumbling over Soviet-era gauge system
Technically, the rail lines in the former Soviet republics could be transformed into a dual-gauge system but that would mean higher costs both in initial modifications and in ensuing maintenance. Apart from tracks, different technical criteria, such as signal and electrical systems as well as standards of curves and slopes, make dual-gauge construction more difficult than adding one rail. Beijing may not be willing to shoulder the expense. Furthermore, the wide gauge system was designed by Tsarist Russia to deny any potential foreign invader any logistical convenience. This fact remains a significant strategic concern. Therefore, the governments that use the wide gauge may not want to abandon this arrangement, as the standard gauge tracks connect not only to China but also to Western Europe.
Diplomacy of Connectivity
The dependence upon transferability between different rail systems also means that ‘diplomatic grease’ must be applied all along the new Silk Road. Sovereign railroad authorities must cooperate in approving licenses, coordinating timetables, arranging adequate engines, and other operational matters for the transfer of cargo and rolling stock. National and privatized rail companies ought to establish reliable and open protocols for communication regarding not only cargo transfer but also safety regulations.
Finally, the political assurance of uninterrupted rail transit must be guaranteed as far as possible if business interest is to be sustained. This may be a great deal to ask considering that Central Asian states still have to consolidate their governance in regard to containing separatist movements, insurgencies, and the rule of law. If the new Silk Road is to live up to its promise, diplomatic grease is the final necessary and sufficient ingredient.
For now, it looks like the other half of OBOR – the Maritime Silk Road – could have a relatively smoother sail. It will have to admit transit by ships of all registrations and ownerships, and on internationally recognized waters through the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca through the Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea. It also has to retain a more democratic, flexible, and politically accommodating edge over rail transport through the Eurasian heartland.
For politicians, citizens, businessmen, and rail companies alike, the new Silk Road requires much more work to establish its credentials as a credible alternative to the time-honored efficacy of maritime trade transit. On a slightly more positive note, the new services would suggest tighter and shorter direct rail links between China and its trading partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which may prove more crucial for the ultimate feasibility of the One Belt, One Road vision.
第一条横贯大陆铁路之间的中国和欧洲于2017年1月18日到达伦敦,开始它的旅程,离义乌12000公里的浙江省东部整整18天之后,其货物的服装、箱包、和其他消费品。火车载着24个集装箱被德国铁路机车的最后一站,途经哈萨克斯坦、俄罗斯、白俄罗斯、波兰、德国、比利时、法国抵达英国之前。一个类似的海上航行需要30天或更长时间,尽管有惊人的20000个集装箱。
横跨欧亚腹地的铁路象征着新的陆上丝绸之路?官方称之为丝绸之路经济带?部分实现“一带一路”(OBOR)视觉中国,包括许多高速铁路项目被许多亚洲在过去的十年。而先锋货运列车服务与现实中的英国和中国,大张旗鼓的欢迎,一些障碍躺在不平滑的丝绸之路。
不同量具及操作人员
几个因素限制了铁路实现北京目标的潜力的有效性。几十条现有的铁路连接实际上并不是相互连接的。哈萨克斯坦、俄罗斯和中国的铁路系统采用1.52米宽的标准,这是苏联遗留下来的,而中国和欧洲的系统使用的标准轨距为1.435米。这意味着货物必须在火车之间进行物理转移,每当两个区域之间的仪表,这至少发生在旅途中两次。尽管中国和瑞士承包商管理旅行时间的努力,额外的成本将是不可避免的,而中国的产品通过铁路运输将在市场中处于劣势,相反,通过航运量。
运输货物不可避免地增加旅行时间,并鼓励使用标准集装箱的运费,同时减少运输大件货物,如农作物和一些重型机械。这些散装货物可能更具竞争力的内陆国家的贸易,而不是制造或加工商品的容器。洲际货运服务,因此没有明显改善那些内陆国家在全球市场的经济地位。
目前,轨距可变轴车辆(VGA)对列车运行不同的仪表,尤其是转移的标准和广泛的仪表,可在几个欧洲国家,包括货运服务。然而,这种昂贵的和复杂的设计,主要用于旅客列车,仍然是不切实际的许多货运列车和不为中国目前的经济的解决方案。虽然中国可能会推出VGA技术降低成本的地方制造,VGA的部署将逻辑乘法的翻新和运输成本在整个陆上丝绸之路。
苏联时代测量系统的困惑
从技术上讲,前苏联共和国的铁路线可以转化为双轨距系统,但这意味着在最初的修改和随后的维护更高的成本。除了轨道,不同的技术标准,如信号和电气系统,以及标准的曲线和斜坡,使双规结构更难比增加一个铁路。北京未必愿意承担费用。此外,广泛的测量系统是由沙俄设计拒绝任何潜在的外国侵略者的任何物流便利。这一事实仍然是一个重大的战略问题。因此,使用宽口径的政府可能不想放弃这个安排,为标准轨距轨道连接不仅对中国而且对西欧。
外交的连通性
在不同的轨道系统之间的依赖性也意味着外交的油脂必须沿着新丝绸之路的应用。铁路部门必须在批准的许可证的主权,合作协调的时间表,安排足够的引擎,和其他业务事项转移货物的车辆。国家和私有化的铁路公司应建立可靠的、开放的不仅是货物转移而且安全规定的通信协议。
最后,如果要维持商业利益,就必须尽可能保证不间断轨道交通的政治保障。这可能要考虑到中亚国家仍然要巩固在含的分离主义运动,叛乱治理很大,与法治。如果新的丝绸之路要实现它的诺言,外交上的油脂是最后的必要和充分的成分。
现在,它看起来像OBOR的另一半吗?海上丝绸之路?可以有相对顺畅的帆。它将不得不承认通过所有登记和所有权的船舶,并通过南海国际认可的水域,通过印度洋马六甲海峡,与地中海。它还必须保持一个更民主,灵活和政治上的边缘,铁路运输通过欧亚中心地带。
对于政治家来说,市民,商人,和铁路公司一样,新丝绸之路需要更多的工作来建立其作为可信的替代海上贸易运输历史悠久的疗效。在一个稍微更积极的方面,新的服务建议越短直接铁路连接中国和上海合作组织(SCO)的贸易伙伴之间,这可能是更关键的一个带最终的可行性,一路视觉。