Daniel L. Byman
Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
A new day, a new president, a new set of challenges for the foreign policy establishment.
It’s hard to be a member of the foreign policy establishment. President George W. Bush challenged many of the establishment’s basic premises with his emphasis on preemption and Texas-tough rhetoric. Many of us breathed a sigh of relief when Obama came in. Surely the cerebral University of Chicago law professor, with his conciliatory rhetoric and embrace of alliances, would realize our worth. Yet he too quickly tired of us, his team derisively referring to think tanks and policy intellectuals as “the blob.”
And now there is Trump. More than any candidate in my memory, he has challenged basic foreign policy assumptions and dismissed the value of traditional expertise. Some of his Cabinet picks bring considerable experience to the job, but many are relative newcomers with little track record as policymakers.
But does that mean they will be a disaster, or might they be a breath of fresh air? After all, it’s not as if U.S. foreign policy has succeeded brilliantly in recent years.
So let’s consider some of the assumptions Trump and his team appear to bring to the table as they enter office. Some are about how the world works, while others concern the best way to design and implement U.S. foreign policy.
Assumption #1: Calling it “Radical Islam” Makes a Difference
Trump and his advisors have stressed the evil of “radical Islam” and blasted the Obama administration for refusing the use the term. Presumably, the new president will regularly employ the term, though it is not clear how this will shape his policy. The President’s team believes the clarity associated with the term will help better identify the enemy and properly broaden the war against terrorism beyond a particular group or groups: the right language will mean the right enemy, and that will mean the right policy.
Yet how much such rhetoric matters is an open question. Critics blasted Bush for using a “war” metaphor when discussing how to fight terrorism because it seemed to prioritize military solutions and made the fight against a tactic rather than a particular set of enemies. Yet President Bush also pushed public diplomacy, intelligence collection, and other non-military measures, and he did not try to fight every terrorist everywhere. Obama’s reluctance to use the term “radical Islam” didn’t seem to stop him from an aggressive campaign to kill terrorist leaders and bringing the fight to countries like Libya and Somalia, in addition to more traditional battlegrounds like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
If using the term to guide policy does matter, it may make things worse, not better. The term is so broad as to be potentially meaningless—there are many groups that are violent but not anti-U.S., and still others that are hostile to America but not violent. Spreading the war to fight any potential foe risks making it vast and (even more) endless.
Assumption #2: Foreign Public Opinion Doesn’t Matter
Winning the hearts and minds of foreigners (or Democratic voters, for that matter) doesn’t matter much to Trump. More broadly, Trump’s belligerent assertion of an America-first policy wins him admiration among anti-immigrant zealots and other right-wingers in Europe—admittedly an ascendant lot—but it invites scorn among more cosmopolitan Europeans and intellectuals, including many government officials.
It is right for Trump and his senior officials to ask “so what?” The link between public opinion and anti-U.S. terrorism or anti-U.S. policy is often weak. Leaders will, or at least should, follow their own countries’ interests and domestic politics when designing their foreign policies. Just as they hold their noses and work with political enemies at home to advance their domestic agendas, they may do so in their foreign policies. And we still struggle to figure out why foreigners embrace anti-U.S. terrorism. I can give you a lot of potential reasons for thinking public opinion matters (including several I believe), but the evidence is not strong. And we’re going to find out if the Trump hypothesis here has merit.
Assumption #3: Allies are Overrated
Just as Trump appears to care little about foreign public opinion, he is also skeptical of traditional allies. Despite efforts by incoming Cabinet members to play up the importance of allies and the need for NATO, the new president often derides them. In a post-election interview with European journalists, Trump declared NATO “obsolete,” slammed German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and seemed to encourage the breakup of the European Union.
As I’ve argued in other contexts, U.S. allies are far from perfect (and, to be fair, they more than return the compliment when talking about the United States). Many European allies do not spend enough on their own militaries, as the president has highlighted. Some allies also behave recklessly because they know the United States is there to back them up, which risks entrapping the United States in conflicts better avoided.
But president after president has put up with them because they are necessary. To fight terrorists, the United States needs bases and access. When allies put in their own troops, it eases the burden on the U.S. military and places fewer American lives at risk. When it comes to persuading or coercing a rival like China, having allies lined up greatly increases U.S. bargaining power, magnifying the value of sanctions and other threats.
Alienating our friends could be a disastrous mistake, particularly if at the same time, he turns their publics against America. Trump is likely to find out that many of his foreign policy goals cannot be accomplished without help.
Assumption #4: Russia Is America’s Natural Partner
If rejecting traditional allies was not dramatic enough, Trump also sees Russia as a logical partner. Trump and his National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, believe Russia can be a vital ally in fighting the Islamic State, and his choice for Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, has strong business connections to Russia, though in hearings he has tried to distance himself from Moscow. Trump seems unconcerned about Russia’s aggressiveness in Ukraine and Europe in general and had considered lifting the sanctions imposed by the Obama administration. Once again, the new president appears at odds with some among his own chosen Cabinet, many of whom expressed concerns about Russia during their confirmation hearings. CIA Director-designate Mike Pompeo even chastized Russia for interfering with the U.S. election. Many Republican members of Congress have also expressed skepticism, to put it mildly, about the value of a closer relationship with Russia. Naive thinking about the Kremlin, in their eyes, was a pipe dream of Democrats, not Republicans.
A better relationship with Russia would be a good thing—but only if it’s on America’s terms. The Obama administration too tried to “reset” relations with Moscow, only to see them get even worse. But if Russia were to end its meddling in Ukraine, ease pressure on the Baltics, and stop backing Middle Eastern thugs like Bashar al-Assad, it would help regional stability and make it more likely that local democracies would flourish. No one seems to think that’s likely, but Trump seems to be willing to embrace Moscow on Putin’s terms, not America’s. He might accept a Russian sphere of influence in its neighborhood, even if it means the de facto dismemberment of Ukraine and forcing other nearby states to kowtow to Moscow. If he truly doesn’t care, then nothing will be lost in his eyes. The payoff presumably would be more cooperation against the Islamic State, though it’s not clear to me just how useful this would be. A direct alliance with Russia also puts America openly on the side of Moscow, which is loathed throughout the Sunni world for its backing of the genocidal Assad regime.
Assumption #5: Israel Can Do What it Wants
U.S. presidents in recent years openly side with Israel when it has disputes with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbors. The United States offers Israel massive economic and military support and serves as the small state’s diplomatic champion. When it has not done so, such as Obama’s decision in his final days to abstain on a toothless anti-settlements resolution, it’s big news. Trump, however, promises to take America’s pro-Israel stance one step further. As a candidate, he called for uncritical support for the Jewish state and, as proof, appointed an ambassador who immediately stated he “[intends] to work tirelessly to strengthen the unbreakable bond” between the U.S. and Israel “from the U.S. embassy in Israel’s eternal capital, Jerusalem.” This acceptance statement alone caused a political uproar, as relocating the U.S. embassy to Jerusalemwould break two decades of diplomatic precedent against moving to the disputed city and, more importantly, dangerously antagonize, if not provoke, the Palestinians. Yet David Friedman, a long-time advisor and bankruptcy lawyer for Trump, is certainly no stranger to courting controversy over his pro-Israel efforts. Beyond his extensive advocacy for Israeli far-right positions, including expanding West Bank settlements and even outright annexation of occupied territory, Friedman has directly funded and supported Beit El, a settlement outside Ramallah. Thus, Trump’s pick effectively signals a rejection of the traditional U.S. positions against settlements and for a two-state solution.
The peace process has been dead for years, despite Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to revive the corpse. So Trump’s abandonment of it is more a recognition of reality than a dramatic change in policy. But his apparent willingness to side with Israel no matter what is a significant shift.
This may not matter. The salience of the Israel-Palestinian divide has declined as the Syrian civil war and other issues have risen to the fore in the Middle East. America may lose a few points in regional public opinion but, as noted above, that won’t give Trump sleepless nights.
This openly uncritical backing of Israel, however, will change Israeli politics dramatically. Israeli political leaders exploit U.S. pressure to avoid foolish policies demanded by domestic audiences. Because both elite and public opinion in Israel recognize the value of the U.S. alliance, prime ministers cite the dratted Americans as a reason to end a flailing military operation, resist calls to suspend peace talks after a terrorist attack, and otherwise take politically costly steps that they know are in their own interests. Now Israeli leaders won’t have this excuse and may even have an ambassador urging on greater folly.
Assumption #6: The Rough Stuff Works
On the campaign trail, Trump promised to reauthorize torture—vowing to “bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding.” He also pledged to reverse Obama’s policy of steadily transferring terrorist detainees to partner nations, instead claiming “we are keeping open [the Guantanamo Bay detention facility]… and we’re gonna load it up with some bad dudes.” Trump has walked away from some of this: after a conversation with Secretary of Defense nominee (and retired Marine General) James Mattis, the President claimed to be surprised. Specifically on the utility of waterboarding, Trump shared Mattis’ response: “I’ve always found, give me a pack of cigarettes and a couple of beers and I do better with that than I do with torture.” His designated CIA director, Mike Pompeo, has also rejected torture. However, despite being “impressed,” Trump still refused to definitively disavow torture. Instead he has continued to set a tone of toughness as have several of his advisors.
Torture’s value in the war on terrorism is hotly debated to this day. Critics believe that U.S. waterboarding and other measures against senior Al Qaeda leaders did not yield any significant information from terrorists while alienating world opinion and producing a torrent of misinformation. Proponents, including many Republicans, believe it did produce information of value and corroborated many important existing reports. Guantanamo—and with it the value of some form of detention without trial—is debated, both for its legality and for whether the outrage it produces exacerbates terrorism or not.
It is not likely to me that a Trump administration would repeat the exact rough measures used under Bush or revive the specific program, but we should be on the lookout for ruthless techniques or policies that human rights groups would question. In addition, Trump’s team could broaden existing Obama programs in ways that would trouble human rights advocates. For example, on drone strikes, Trump could relax the rules of engagement, making it easier to attack suspected terrorists by lowering the bar for civilian casualties and other collateral damage. Similarly, he might also work with nasty governments or substate groups that are fighting terrorists, even if these partners regularly commit atrocities.
Assumption #7: Tough Policymakers Make for Tough Policy
Trump has put in place an unprecedented number of military men in senior position: Marine Gen. Jim Mattis for Defense Secretary, Marine Gen. John Kelly for Homeland Security Secretary, former Navy SEAL Cdr. Ryan Zinke (also a Congressman) for Interior Secretary, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor, and Army Maj. Vincent Viola as Army Secretary. The working assumption seems to be that these are tough, no-nonsense men who will take on terrorists, use rough stuff, call out Radical Islam, and otherwise move away from the namby-pamby approach of the Obama administration and us blob types.
This one might be dramatically wrong. No one doubts that Kelly, Mattis, and other are personally tough. But having seen war, rarely are military men eager for the young men and women of this country to see it again if it is not necessary. The scholars Michael Horowitz and Allan Stam found “military personnel that become civilian political leaders tend to be strong, but less militaristic,” particularly if they have had combat experience. Despite many myths and movie scenes to the contrary, military leaders are often quite respectful of international law. It is this same law, of course, that protects U.S. soldiers from mistreatment when the enemy captures them. My experience interacting with military leaders is that they also believe they are the tip of the spear for the forces of civilization. That often means bloodshed, but it also means restraint. We are the good guys, after all, and we must walk the walk.
Perhaps most important, military leaders tend to value allies. For all the jabs about feckless Europeans or incompetent Middle Eastern militaries, allies play a wide range of vital military roles. One of the most important is providing troops who fight, and often die, to protect American interests (and, of course, those of their own countries). In addition, allies provide important bases, access to the battlefield, logistical support, and other military necessities.
I’d expect most of the generals to be voices of caution, not warriors foaming at the mouth.
新的一天,新的总统,外交政策制定的新挑战。
很难成为外交政策制定的一员。小布什总统以先发制人的态度和德克萨斯强硬的言辞挑战了该组织的许多基本前提。奥巴马进来时,我们许多人松了一口气。当然,脑芝加哥大学法学教授,与他和解的修辞和拥抱的联盟,将实现我们的价值。但他很快厌倦了我们,他的团队经常提到的智库和政策的知识分子为“斑点”。
现在有特朗普。比我记忆中的任何候选人,他挑战了基本的外交政策的假设,并驳回了传统的专业知识的价值。他的一些内阁挑选给这项工作带来了相当多的经验,但许多人都是相对的新手,几乎没有政策制定者的记录。
但这是否意味着他们将是一场灾难,或他们可能是一个新鲜的空气呼吸?毕竟,近年来美国外交政策并没有取得辉煌的成就。
因此,让我们考虑一些假设特朗普和他的团队似乎带来的表,因为他们进入办公室。一些是关于世界如何运作,而另一些人则关注设计和实施美国外交政策的最佳方式。
假设1:#称它“激进的伊斯兰教”的区别
特朗普和他的顾问们强调了“激进伊斯兰”的邪恶,并抨击奥巴马政府拒绝使用这个术语。据推测,新总统将定期使用这个词,但目前还不清楚这将如何塑造他的政策。总统的团队认为,与该术语相关的清晰性将有助于更好地识别敌人,适当地扩大反恐战争,超越特定的群体或群体:正确的语言将意味着正确的敌人,这意味着正确的政策。
然而,这么多的修辞问题是一个悬而未决的问题。批评者抨击布什使用“战争”的比喻在讨论如何打击恐怖主义,因为它似乎优先考虑军事解决方案,并作出了对抗战术,而不是一组特定的敌人。然而,布什总统也推动了公共外交,情报收集和其他非军事措施,他没有试图打击每一个恐怖无处不在。奥巴马不愿用“激进的伊斯兰教”似乎并没有阻止他积极竞选杀死恐怖分子领导人将战斗到像利比亚和索马里这些国家,除了传统的战场,像阿富汗,巴基斯坦,伊拉克。
如果用这个词来指导政策确实很重要,那可能会使事情变得更糟,而不是更好。这个词是如此广泛,可能毫无意义,有许多团体,暴力但不反美,还有人说是敌视美国的但不是暴力。传播战争,以打击任何潜在的敌人,使其巨大的风险(甚至更多)无尽。
假设2:#外国舆论并不重要
赢得外国人(或民主党选民,这件事)的心和心并不重要,特朗普。更广泛地说,特朗普的好战声明一个美国第一的政策为他赢得了反移民的右翼狂热分子和其他在欧洲是一个方兴未艾的众多倾慕但它邀请对更国际化的欧洲人和知识分子,包括许多政府官员。
这是正确的特朗普和他的高级官员问“那么什么?“舆论和反美恐怖主义或反美政策之间的联系往往是弱。领导人在制定外交政策时,至少应该遵循自己国家的利益和国内政治。正如他们坚持自己的观点,与国内的政敌一起努力推进他们的国内议程一样,他们在外交政策上也可能这样做。我们还是想不通为什么外国人接受反美恐怖主义。我可以给你很多思考舆论的潜在原因事项(包括我相信的几个),但证据不强。我们要弄清楚特朗普假设是否有优点。
假设3:#盟友被高估了
正如特朗普似乎不关心外国舆论,他也怀疑传统盟友。尽管传入的内阁成员努力发挥了盟国和北约的需要的重要性,新总统经常嘲笑他们。在与欧洲记者的选举后的采访中,特朗普宣布北约“过时”,抨击德国总理Angela Merkel,并似乎鼓励欧盟解体。
正如我在其他情况下所争论的,美国的盟友远非完美(而且,公平地说,他们在谈论美国时不仅仅是赞扬)。许多欧洲盟友没有花足够的他们自己的军队,作为总统强调。一些盟友也无所顾忌地因为他们知道美国有备份,哪些风险将美国更好的避免冲突。
但总统后总统已经忍受了他们,因为他们是必要的。打击恐怖分子,美国需要基地和访问。当盟军投入他们自己的军队时,它减轻了美军的负担,减少了美国人的生命危险。当它来说服或强迫对手像中国,有盟友排队大大增加美国的谈判筹码,放大的制裁和其他威胁的价值。
跟我们的朋友可能是一个灾难性的错误,特别是如果在同一时间,他把他们的公众对美国。特朗普很可能会发现他的许多外交政策目标都离不开帮助。
假设# 4:俄罗斯是美国的天然伙伴
如果拒绝传统盟友是不够戏剧性,特朗普也认为俄罗斯作为一个合乎逻辑的合作伙伴。特朗普和他的国家安全顾问,Michael Flynn认为俄罗斯可以在对抗伊斯兰国家的一个重要盟友,和他的国务卿,Rex Tillerson的选择,具有很强的业务连接到俄罗斯,虽然在听证会上他试图自己与莫斯科的距离。特朗普似乎并不关心俄罗斯的攻击在乌克兰和欧洲一般,奥巴马政府曾考虑解除制裁。又一次,新总统与他自己选择的内阁中的一些人发生了争执,其中许多人在他们的确认听证会上表达了对俄罗斯的担忧。美国中央情报局局长Mike Pompeo甚至chastized指定俄罗斯干涉美国选举。委婉地说,许多共和党国会议员也表达了对与俄罗斯建立更密切关系的价值的怀疑。在他们眼里,对Kremlin的天真想法是民主党人的白日梦,不是共和党人。
与俄罗斯建立更好的关系是件好事,但前提是这取决于美国的条件。奥巴马政府也试图“重设”与莫斯科的关系,只看到他们变得更糟。但如果俄罗斯结束其在乌克兰的干预,减轻对波罗的海国家的压力,并停止支持中东暴徒像Bashar al Assad,这将有助于地区稳定,更容易使地方民主兴旺。似乎没有人认为这是有可能的,但特朗普似乎愿意接受莫斯科对普京的,不是美国的。他会接受在其附近影响俄罗斯的球,即使这意味着乌克兰事实上的肢解和迫使其他邻近国家向莫斯科。如果他真的不在乎,那么在他的眼里什么也不会失去。这笔钱大概是对伊斯兰国家的更多合作,虽然我不清楚这是多么有用。与俄罗斯有着直接的联盟也对美国公开支持莫斯科,这是厌恶在逊尼派世界为其种族灭绝的阿萨德政权的支持。
假设5:#以色列可以做它想做什么
近年来,美国总统在与巴勒斯坦及其邻国阿拉伯发生争执时公开与以色列合作。美国为以色列提供了大量的经济和军事支持,并作为小国的外交冠军。当它没有这样做,比如他最后的日子里,奥巴马决定放弃在牙防沉降的决议,这是大新闻。特朗普,但是,承诺采取美国亲以色列立场一步。作为一个候选人,他呼吁对以色列无条件的支持,作为证明,任命大使,他立即表示他“[拟]要努力加强牢不可破”之间的美国和以色列从美国驻以色列大使馆的永恒的首都,耶路撒冷。“这验收报告单独引起的政治哗,迁美国大使馆jerusalemwould打破二十多年的外交先例不搬到有争议的城市,更重要的是,危险的对抗,如果不是挑衅,巴勒斯坦人。然而,David Friedman,一个长期的顾问和特朗普的破产律师,当然是在他的亲以色列的努力没有争议的陌生人。在他为以色列右翼阵地广泛宣传,包括扩建西岸定居点甚至直接吞并领土,弗里德曼直接资助和支持Beit El,拉马拉以外的结算。因此,特朗普的选择有效地表明了反对传统的美国立场对定居点和两个国家的解决方案。
和平进程已经死了多年,尽管奥巴马国务卿John Kerry的努力,以恢复尸体。因此,特朗普放弃了对现实的认识,而不是政策的戏剧性变化。但他显然愿意与以色列无论是什么重大转变。
这可能并不重要。Palestinian的以色列将突出为叙利亚内战等问题拒绝在中东上升到前。美国可能会失去几个点在区域舆论,但如上所述,这不会给王牌不眠之夜。
这种公开的不支持以色列,然而,将以色列的政治变化。以色列政治领导人利用美国施压避免国内观众要求的愚蠢政策。因为无论是精英和公众舆论在以色列认识的美国联盟的价值,总理引用的美国人作为一个理由来结束一个摇摇欲坠的军事行动,呼吁抵制暂停和谈的恐怖袭击后,否则采取政治上昂贵的步骤,他们知道在自己的利益。现在,以色列领导人不会有这个借口,甚至可能有一个大使呼吁更大的愚蠢。
假设6:#粗糙的东西的作品
在竞选中,特朗普承诺授权酷刑发誓要“带回来一大堆比水刑。”他还表示要改变奥巴马的政策稳步转移恐怖在押人员合作伙伴国家,反而声称“我们保持开放的[关塔那摩湾拘留设施]…我们要加载它一些坏家伙。”特朗普已经离开了这部分:在对话与国防部长提名人(和退休海军上将)James Mattis总统声称是意外。特别是对公用水刑,特朗普分享了马蒂斯的回应:“我总是发现,给我一包香烟和几瓶啤酒,我做的更好,比我做的酷刑。”他指定的中央情报局局长,Mike Pompeo也拒绝折磨。然而,尽管是“印象深刻,”特朗普仍然不肯明确否认刑讯逼供。相反,他仍然像他的几位顾问一样,树立了一种强硬的态度。
酷刑在反恐战争中的价值一直争论不休,直到今天。批评者认为,美国基地组织高级领导人的反对水刑和其他措施没有取得任何重要的信息从恐怖分子而疏远世界舆论和生产大量的错误信息。支持者,包括许多共和党人,相信它确实产生了价值的信息,并证实了许多重要的现有报告。关塔那摩,它不经审判拘留一些形式价值的争论,对其合法性和是否产生的愤怒加剧恐怖主义或不。
我不太可能认为特朗普政府会重复使用布什所采取的确切措施,或者恢复具体方案,但我们应该警惕人权组织所质疑的无情的技术或政策。此外,特朗普的团队可以扩大现有的奥巴马计划的方式,会困扰人权倡导者。例如,在无人机打击下,特朗普可以放宽交战规则,通过降低平民伤亡和其他附带损害,更容易攻击恐怖分子。同样,他也可能会有讨厌的政府或子组,打击恐怖分子的工作,即使这些合作伙伴经常犯下暴行。
假设7:#强硬政策做出艰难的决策者
特朗普将在高级职位的军人前所未有的数量:海军上将Jim Mattis为国防部长,海军上将John Kelly为国土安全部长,前海军海豹CDR。Ryan Zinke(也是一个国会议员)为内政部长,陆军少将Michael Flynn担任国家安全顾问,Vincent Viola为陆军部长和陆军少校。工作的假设似乎是,这些都是很难的,没有废话的人会对恐怖分子,使用粗糙的东西,叫激进的伊斯兰教,否则离开娇媚的奥巴马政府和美国的BLOB类型。
这可能是巨大的错误。没有人怀疑凯莉,马提斯,和其他个人艰难。但看到战争,很少有军人渴望这个国家的年轻男女再次看到它,如果没有必要。Michael Horowitz和Allan Stam发现“军事人员,成为政治领袖往往是坚强的学者,但不穷兵黩武,“特别是如果他们有作战经验。尽管有许多神话和电影场景相反,军事领导人往往相当尊重国际法。同样的法律,当然,保护美国的士兵免受虐待,当敌人抓住他们。我与军方领导人互动的经验是,他们也相信他们是文明力量的矛。这往往意味着流血,但也意味着克制。毕竟我们是好人,我们必须走着走。
也许最重要的是,军事领导人倾向于重视盟友。对于所有关于欧洲或中东的军队软弱无能的攻击,盟国发挥广泛的重要的军事角色。其中一个最重要的是提供部队谁战斗,往往死,以保护美国的利益(当然,他们自己的国家)。此外,盟军提供重要基地,进入战场,后勤保障,以及其他军事必需品。
我想大多数将军都是谨慎的声音,而不是战士口吐白沫。